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II. THE SCOPE OF JUSTICIABILITY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
JAPANESE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION: THE
FIRST TWENTY YEARS
DAN FENNO HENDERSON
The Constitution of 1947 for the first time opened to the Japanese
courts the possibilities of judicial review of legislation. Since then
the courts have moved to develop this new power by case decisions.
The new role for the judiciary in refining Japanese constitutionalism
flows from two premises which were drafted into the Constitution:
(1) that popular government necessarily means government limited by
law; and (2) that any law, constitutional or otherwise worthy of the
name, confers rights justiciable in the ordinary courts of law.
Prior to 1947, the prerogative of determining the constitutionality
of statutes and official acts did not rest with the judiciary. The Meiji
Constitution (1889) was largely a formalization of the power struc-
ture built by the oligarchy which led the Meiji restoration (1868).
Under it, the ruling elite interpreted the constitution in fact, and the
scholars developed its theory in textbooks and scholarly disquisitions;
differences of opinion on constitutional issues were determined by
political- preferences; they were not justiciable issues legally deter-
minable.'
The shift in 1947 from a political to a legal (or justiciable) con-
sutution of Anglo-American design meant also a shift from professors
to the courts as the authoritative expounders of the Constitution,
though of course the leading critics and synthesizers are still the
scholars. Soon followed, for the first time, a body of Supreme Court
decisions which became the detailed sources of constitutional law,
presaging adoption throughout the legal profession of a new juristic
method in the public law field using scholarly theories where appro-
priate but rooted in case analysis. These changes in professional roles,
sources and methods have caused a new emphasis on American con-
stitutional studies and perhaps some dilution of the prior preferences
for continental European theories. But these transitions have not
'Takayanagi, The Conceptual Background of the Constitutional Revision Debate
in the Constitution Investigation Commission, 1 LAW INi JAPAN 15 (1967).
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taken place without some groping for direction, and it is the purpose
of this introduction to outline briefly some of the postwar develop-
ments. Emphasis is placed on the functioning of Japanese judicial
review, not its substantive results.'
I. THE PRE-1945 ANTECEDENTS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Much of the interest to American comparative lawyers in recent
Japanese judicial decisions defining the new judicial power comes not
only from the achievements of the past twenty years, but also from
the analytical paths traversed en route. This is because, to an Ameri-
can lawyer, the results might seem obvious from a reading of the
constitutional provision for judicial review,4 which seems like a simple
codification of Marbury v. Madison." Yet to the Japanese jurist of
1952, faced with a confluence of traditional and continental constitu-
tional theory from his immediate past with American constitutional
law from the allied occupation, the meaning and implementation of
Article 81 were far from obvious.'
Though the judicial theories underlying the Meiji Constitution have
been more fully set forth elsewhere in English,7 it is useful here to
note this legacy of the Japanese jurist. Of the general position of the
Constitution in the Imperial government, a leading architect of the
'D. Henderson, Law and Political Modernization in Japan, in POLITICAL DEVEL-
OPMENT IN MODERN JAPA N, 405, 423, 445 (R. Ward ed. 1968). See Kakudo, The Doc-
trine of Judicial Review in Japan, 2 OSAKA L. REV. 59 (1953) for a discussion of
scholarly theories.
For studies in English of the doctrinal results of judicial review in Japan, see the
articles by Beer, Ukai and Nathanson, and George infra this symposium. Also some
twenty-six decisions are translated in J. MAKI, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN
(1964) [hereinafter cited as MAKI]. Other studies: M. Ito, The Rule of Law: Con-
stitutional Development, in LAW OF JAPAN 205 (A. von Mehren ed., 1963) ; K. Hashi-
moto, The Rule of Law: Some Aspects of Judicial Review of Administrative Action,
in LAw OF JAPAN 239 (A. von Mehren ed., 1963) ; Nathanson, Constitutional Adjndi-
cation in Japan, 7 Am. J. ComP. L. 195 (1958) ; Nathanson, Constitutional Protection
of Freedont of Assembly in Japan and the United States, 12 INT'L COMP. L. Q. 1032
(1963) ; Nathanson, Human Rights in Japan through the Looking Glass of the Sn-
prenle Court Opinions, 11 HOWARD L.J. 318 (1965) ; Ouchi, Defamation and Con-
stitntional Freedom in Japan, 11 A-M. J. ComP. L. 73 (1962) ; Tokikuni, Obscenity
and the Japanese Constitution, 51 Ky. L.J. 703 (1963). George, Impact of the Past
on the Right of the Accused in Japan, 14 Am. J. ComP. L. 672 (1965-66).
'JAPANESE CONST. art. 81: The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with
power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official
act.
55 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Kakudo, Tile Doctrine of Judicial Review in Japan, 2 OSAKA L. REV. 59 (1953).
'E.g., H. QUIGLEY, JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 273-90 (1932); T. Hattori,
The Legal Profession in Japan: Its Historical Development and Present State, in
LAW IN JAPAN 111, 119 (A. von Mehren ed., 1963). See in Japanese, S. UESUGI.
KEMP6 JIJTSUGI 594 (rev. ed. 1940).
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Meiji Constitution, Hirobumi t6, wrote in 1889 when the Constitu-
tion was promulgated:'
The doctrine of the independence of the three powers (the judicature,
the executive and the legislature), which prevailed in Europe at the close
of the last century, has already been condemned both by scientific prin-
ciples and by practical experience. The judicature is combined in the
sovereign power of the Emperor as part of His executive power. The
word "executive," when used as opposed to the word "legislative," has a
comprehensive signification: the judiciary is only a part of the executive,
and the executive, strictly speaking, is made up of two parts, the judi-
ciary and the administrative, each performing distinct services. This
principle is at present generally acknowledged by writers on public law,
and it is not necessary in this place to dwell upon the subject. Though it
is in the power of the Sovereign to appoint judges, and though the courts
of law have to pronounce judgment in the name of the Sovereign, yet
the Sovereign does not take it upon Himself to conduct trials, but causes
independent courts to do so, in accordance to law and regardless of the
influence of the administrative. Such is what is meant by the independ-
ence of the judicature. This theory has no connection with the doctrine
of the independence of the three powers, but it is still an immutable prin-
ciple.
More concretely, prewar law courts were placed under the Ministry
of Justice for administration of judicial appointments, promotions and
the like, which was, no doubt, an inhibiting factor for the judges,
though there is wide agreement that after unsuccessful attempts to
pressure the judges in the famous test case' of Wada Sanz6 involving
the stabbing of the Russian Crown Prince (later Nicholas II), the
government did not try to influence judges in the decision of specific
cases.
The Meiji judicial power was also divided into law courts and ad-
ministrative courts' 0 so that the law courts only functioned in the
private law area to resolve disputes between private individuals con-
cerning contracts, torts, property and family matters, whereas the
separate administrative court alone could handle claims against offi-
cials for exceeding their authority. Only one such administrative court
existed, and its jurisdiction was quite limited. As noted elsewhere, "the
legal limits on administrative power as practiced in prewar Japan were
I H. ITO, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN 103(1889).
'See T. OSATAKE, KONAN jIKEN (1951).
"MEIJI CoNsT. art. 61. See Ogawa, Judicial Review of Administrative Actions in
Japan, in this symposium p. 1075 infra.
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indeed formalistic and often illusory because of the way the basic
public law-private law dichotomy, borrowed from the civil law world,
worked in Japan.... There was, rather, a de facto dual status wherein
officials remained largely above the justiciable law."'"
Also, neither the law courts nor the administrative courts could re-
view legislation for constitutionality for, as Hirobumi It6 succinctly
states, "... . the duty of the [Meiji] judiciary is to pronounce judgment
upon the infringements of right, according to the provisions of the
law. In the judiciary, law is everything... ,12 "Law" in this context
excluded any idea of a superceding constitutional law to be admin-
istered by the court; law which the Diet enacted and regulations and
rules issued thereunder were conclusively valid. These Meiji principles
of judicial power flowed analytically from the imported German di-
chotomy of public and private law. But the whole Meiji Constitution
was also heavily overlaid with a Japanese theocratic concept of Im-
perial sovereignty and absolutism, best understood by reference to
Japanese constitutional scholars of the era. Two of them wrote in
English,13 and their results sound even more bizarre to an American
lawyer than the same thing in the Japanese language-doubtless be-
cause of the impossibility of translating, with complete fidelity, such
pure Japanisms.
Nevertheless, there developed a sort of judicial review after 1916 in
the Great Court of Cassation (Daiskin'in 1875-1947) worthy of notice
in passing. The Great Court of Cassation began to review administra-
tive orders challenged by criminal defendants on grounds of unconsti-
tutionality, but no instance has been found where the court invalidated
an order. In Japan v. Sato, 4 the court did invalidate article 1 of an
order issued under the Foreign Exchange Law because it was found to
exceed the powers delegated by the statute. The case, though treated
as a problem of statutory power, carried the implicit question of the
constitutional balance between the jurisdiction of the Administrative
Court and the Great Court of Cassation as the highest court of law.
Presumably such a question, potentially constitutional, might have
been debated, when properly raised by Imperial rescript, in the Privy
" D. Henderson, Law and Political Modernization in Japan, in POLITICAL DEVELOP-
MENT IN MODERN JAPAN 416 (R. Ward ed., 1968).
1H. ITO, CO-MMENTARIES ON THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION 101 (1889).
" S. FujII, THE ESSENTIALS OF JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1940) ; N. MAT-
SUNAM I, THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION AND POLITICS (1940).
" 16 Daishin'in keiji hanreishfi 193 (Gr. Ct. of Cass., March 3, 1937).
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Council, but the Council virtually never functioned for such pur-
poses. 15
In summary, the Meiji courts were under the Ministry of Justice:
the administrative and law courts were separate; and there was a
complete lack of rule-making power or judicial review of legislation.
All of these features have undergone drastic changes to achieve the
rule of law envisaged by the new Constitution. 6
II. THE NEW JUDICIAL POWER
As has already been suggested, interpretation of Article 81 pre-
sented complications derived perhaps from the broad experience of
Japanese jurists with both the continental and the Anglo-American
traditions. Soon after 1947, ingenious arguments were marshalled for
the proposition that the new Supreme Court's powers of judicial re-
view of "any law, order, regulation or official act" should be exercised
by the Supreme Court sitting as a "constitutional Court" with a spe-
cial "code of constitutional procedure" and rendering declaratory
judgments on abstract questions of constitutionality.' Ironically, some
of these arguments were based on an exegesis of the text of Article 81
itself. One might surmise" that the American lawyers who participated
in its drafting thought Article 81 simply codified Marbury v. Madi-
ll M. HASEGAWA, KEMPO HANMEI NO KENKYU 27 (1956), but see Sat6, Treaties and
the Constitution, in this symposium p. 1057, for comment on the constitutional role of
the Privy Council on Treaty Discussions.
"The Supreme Court's role in realizing the rule of law is mainly based on Articles
81 (see note 4 supra) and 98:
Article 98. This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation and no law,
ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part thereof, con-
trary to the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity.
2. The treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faith-
fully observed.
'
7 Kakudo, The Doctrine of Judicial Review in Japan, 2 OSAKA L. Rav. 59 (1953)
for a summary of such views at their height of influence.
18 But note that in an earlier draft of Article 81 the ultimate power of judicial
review for the Supreme Court was limited to civil rights cases:
As for litigations on the constitutionality of law and order, or administrative
acts pertaining to the provisions of Chapter III [Rights and Duties of the People]
of the Constitution, the trial of the Supreme Court is final.
The Diet may review the judgment of the Supreme Court in litigations on the
constitutionality of law and order or administrative acts other than those above-
mentioned in the preceding paragraph. In such cases the judgment of the Supreme
Court shall not be reversed unless by the concurring vote of two-thirds of all the
members of each House of the Diet.
The Procedure of review in the preceding paragraph shall be fixed by law.
SUPREME COMMAND ALLIED PowERs, POLITICAL REORIENTATION OF JAPAN 1945-1948
(Appendices) 628 (1948). This text is given in English as the First Government Draft
of the Constitution, March 4, 1946; the present wording of Article 81 appeared as
Article 77 in the Second Government Draft of the Constitution (Cabinet Draft)
March 6, 1946 (see p. 634).
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son 1 9 and included the doctrine of Muskrat v. U.S., 20 as well as Mas-
sachusetts v. Mellon.21 In 1953 such eminent scholars as Nobunari
Ukai,22 Hajime Kaneko'2 3 and Toshiyoshi Miyazawa -4 were already
lined up in favor of the American approach, but S6ichi Sasaki2 and
others,26 were arguing strongly for the continental type of review.
The Japanese idea of the constitutional court alparently comes from
the Verfassungsgerichtshof instituted in Austria in 192027 and later in
West Germany in 1947.28 Rather than exercising its powers in a "case
or controversy" context, a constitutional court reviews the statute
itself ("in the abstract") and only at the behest of specified parties,
usually public officers or entities. If the statute is found unconstitu-
tional, it is abolished or loses its entire validity by some formal pro-
cedure calling for publication of notice or legislative consideration.
Our closest equivalent in effect would be those cases where an enact-
ment is said to be unconstitutional ab initio or "on its face." 29 For
jurists with experience in both systems, the text of Article 81 does
support arguments for either the continental or the "case or contro-
versy" approach.
The textual argument for the constitutional court is based on Ar-
ticles 81, 98 and 79. It is said that in contrast to the United States
Constitution, where there is no literal provision made for judicial
review, Article 81 explicitly gives the Supreme Court the power to
determine the constitutionality of any law. So, if a lack of a provision
in the United States Constitution may be interpreted to mean that, due
to limits inherent in the nature of judicial power, law courts can only
review statutes for constitutionality in the process of deciding cases,
then the express grant to the Japanese Supreme Court must be con-
strued as a grant to determine the constitutionality of a statute in
general as a constitutional court; surely blanket authority expressly
15 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
"°219 U.S. 346 (1911).2-262 U.S. 447 (1923).
-Ukai, Ikensei hanketsle no kdryoku, 62 KOKKA GAKKAI ZASSHI 65 (1948).
'Kaneko, Shil,5 seido, 60 KOKKA GAKKAI ZASSHI 511 (1946).
2 Iiyazawa, Saibanso no hrei shinsaken, 1 HORITSU TAIMUZU (No. 4) 7 (1947).
'Sasaki, Saik5 saibansho no Kenpo saiban, 11 K6H6 ZASSHI (No. 1) 1 (1950).
'Nakatani, Hsrei-shinsaken to g5ken-iken-shinsa Ketteiken, 2 H6GAKU RONS6
(No. 1) 22 (1951). For a division of scholars on this and other points see Ashibe,
Iken ripp5 shinsaken no seikaku, JURISUTO (No. 300) 48 (1964). See also J. TAGAMI,
KEMP6 NO RONTEN 304 (1965).
'AUSTRIAN CONST. art. 140 et seq. (1920).
'WEST GERMAN CONST. art. 93 et seq. (1947).
'E.g., Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, (1886). See 0. FIELD, THE EFFECT
OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE 3 (1935) for the "'void ab initio" theory.
[ VOL. 43 : 1005
LEGISLATION
granted must mean something more than no provision at all. This also
distinguishes the Supreme Court from lower courts, which without
such a grant as Article 81, can only review constitutionality in decid-
ing disputes pending before them.30
This new power is also the reason for Article 79 of the Constitu-
tion.31 The argument is that, since the Supreme Court has such im-
portant powers, the justices, unlike their American counterparts, may
be dismissed by the people under Article 79 at the first general election
for the House of Representatives and again after ten years.
The crossroads in this debate was reached in 1952 when Mosabur6
Suzuki, then secretary general of the Social Democratic Party, raised
these same arguments for a "constitutional court" based on the text of
Article 81. The Supreme Court32 chose the American route, apparently
irrevocably. In this landmark case, Suzuki petitioned the Supreme
Court directly claiming exclusive jurisdiction for it to declare the
newly established National Police Reserve unconstitutional as a viola-
tion of the no-war-potential clause of Article 9.33 He argued that al-
though the Supreme Court possessed the character of a judicial court,
it could also exercise special powers, outside of the judicial power and
' Similarly Article 81 has been used to support opposition to the political question
doctrine; that is, the specific grant of Article 81 means an exclusive power to review
all questions, whereas without it the legislature or executive might be left to decide
"political questions" as in the United States or under the Meiji Constitutional theory.
See p. 1015 infra.
'JAPANESE CosT. art. 79: The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Judge and
such number of judges as may be determined by law; all such judges excepting the
Chief Judge shall be appointed by the Cabinet.
2. The appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court shall be reviewed by the
people at the first general election of members of the House of Representatives
following their appointment, and shall be reviewed again at the first general
election of members of the House of Representatives after a lapse of ten (10)
years, and in the same manner thereafter.
3. In cases mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, when the majority of the voters
favors the dismissal of a judge, he shall be dismissed.
4. Matters pertaining to review shall be prescribed by law.
5. The judges of the Supreme Court shall be retired upon the attainment of the
age as fixed by law.
6. All such judges shall receive, at regular stated intervals, adequate compensa-
tion which shall not be decreased during their terms of office.
"Suzuki v. Japan, 6 Saik6 saibansho minji hanreishii [hereinafter cited Minshi](Sup. Ct., April 15, 1953); 73 H6GARU KY6KAI ZASSHI 62 (1956) (comment by Miya-
zawa) ; 29 MINSH6H6 ZASSHI 166 (1954) (comment by Kuroda).
JAPANESE CONsT. art. 9: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on
justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign
right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling interna-
tional disputes.
2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
1968]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
not belonging to either the executive or legislative power-both as a
court of original jurisdiction and as a court of last resort-to deter-
mine in the abstract without a concrete legal dispute before it, the
constitutionality of laws, ordinances, and regulations, and official
acts.
3 1
Specifically on the matter of foreign analogies the Court said:
'
3
When one examines the institutions of foreign countries in this regard,
it is true that, in addition to countries where the judicial courts can
exercise the right to determine questions of constitutionality, there are
other countries where they cannot exercise this power, but where, in-
stead, special organs are established for this purpose. The latter are
empowered, irrespective of whether there exists a concrete legal dispute,
to issue comprehensive and abstract declarations that laws, orders and
the like are unconstitutional, and to set them aside and invalidate them.
However, what is conferred on our courts under the system now in
force is the right to exercise the judicial power, and for this power to
be invoked a concrete legal dispute is necessary....
The plaintiff bases his case on Article 81 of the Constitution, but this
merely provides that the Supreme Court is the court of last resort in
cases involving the Constitution .... [Vith the powers of a special con-
stitutional court] there would be danger of the Court's assuming the
appearance of an organ superior to all other powers in the land, thereby
running counter to the basic principle of democratic government: that
the three powers are independent, equal, and immune from each other's
interference.
The Suzuki case was later relied upon in Tomabechi v. Japan,3" and
thus the Japanese judicial power has since developed along lines rather
close to American concepts. However, as we shall see later in the dis-
cussion of Nakamura v. Japan,37 there is still room for clarification of
the court's position on such concrete questions as: (1) what amounts
to "case or controversy"; (2) who is the proper party to raise particu-
lar constitutional issues; and (3) the actual effect of a "declaration of
unconstitutionality" on past or future similar cases under the same
"unconstitutional statute."
In fact, one feature of the "constitutional court" idea has been
adopted in current Japanese Supreme Court practice. When an official
act is found to be unconstitutional, a copy of the judgment must be
6 Minshfi 783 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Oct. 8, 1952), English translation in MAKI at
363-64.
Id. at 784-85.
" 7 Minshfi 305 (Sup. Ct., G.B., April 15, 1953).
37 Nakamura v. Japan, 16 Saik6 saibansho keiji hanreisha [hereinafter cited Keishfi]
1593 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Nov. 28, 1962).
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published in the Official Gazette and also sent to the Cabinet, and if
the unconstitutional act is a statute, a copy of the judgment must also
be sent to the Diet. This is more formal than the American practice
and rather like the Austrian s or German39 approach in that it seems
to imply that the statute is invalid ab initio.
Before leaving the Japanese debate over a constitutional court, it
should be noted that, in 1964, the Commission on the Constitution
reported several opinions and proposals for amending the Constitution
to permit a special constitutional court. Also, there was a variety of
proposals for revising the judiciary (e.g., to provide special adminis-
trative, military or labor courts, or to revert to certain features of the
old system) .40 But these views, though diverse and interesting, were
advanced by a distinct minority. The general shape of the judicial
power as forged by the court's own decisions is not likely to be changed
by amendments in the future.
Besides laying the Japanese professorial idea of a special constitu-
tional court to rest in 1952, the Japanese Supreme Court by dictum
also noted a second point which concerns the power of lower courts to
review legislation: "... the Supreme Court has power to examine the
constitutionality of laws, orders and the like, but this power may be
exercised only within the limits of the judicial power. In this respect
the Supreme Court is not different from the lower courts. (See Consti-
tution, Article 76(1).)"I' This point, though taken for granted in
American practice, was a problem in Japan, doubtless stemming from
the idea of a constitutional court, which, if it had been accepted, would
mean that lower courts had no such power to review in the abstract
and perhaps not even in a case. But even before the Suzuki case, the
court, in Yanagi v. Japan,42 said that under Article 76(3)" 3 the lower
3See AUSTRrAN CONST. art. 140 (1920).
' SeC WEST GERMAN CONST. (Gesetz iiber das Verfassungsgericht, art. 31(2)(1947)).
"Much detail on the revisions proposed before the Commission and the views and
opinions of scholars and statesmen can be found in Kempa chosakai hokokushofozoku bunsho No. 8 (Report of the Commission on the Constitution, Attached Docu-
ment No. 8) KEMP5 CHOSAKAI, KOKUMIN NO KENRI OYOBI GIMU: SHIH6 NI KANSURTJ
H6KOKUSHO 103 (1964).
" Suzuki v. Japan, 6 Minshfl 783 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Oct. 8, 1952), English translation
in MAKI, at 364.
"Yanagi v. Japan, 4 Keishai 72 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 1, 1950).
'
3 JAPANESE CONST. art. 76: The whole judicial power is vested in a Supreme
Court and in such inferior courts as are established by law.
2. No extraordinary tribunal shall be established, nor shall any organ or agency
of the Executive be given final judicial power.
3. All judges shall be independent in the exercise of their conscience and shall
be bound only by this Constitution and the laws.
1968]
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courts were also authorized, indeed required, in their handling of law-
suits to review for constitutionality. The special point of the Yanagi
case can only be understood, however, if it is remembered that in the
Japanese appellate system for cases initiated in the then Ward Courts
(earlier counterpart of today's Summary Courts), the court below was
the court of jdkoku44 appeal, i.e., the second and otherwise final ap-
peal. This case started in the Hachi6ji Ward Court in 1946 with a kiso
appeal to the Tokyo District Courts, and a second appeal (jckoku)
to the Tokyo High Courts. Such cases, which occur in substantial
numbers, would not normally reach the Supreme Court at all, but if
the lower courts were held unable to review for constitutionality, the
design of the appellate hierarchy which insulates the Supreme Court
from these lesser cases would be frustrated by constitutional appeals
to it, even where Supreme Court precedents already exist.
A third point, the political question doctrine," was raised dramati-
cally in Japan v. Sakata.46 In a certain sense all constitutional ques-
tions had been "political questions" beyond the competence of the
courts under the Meiji Constitution.4 7 Article 81 of the new Constitu-
tion clearly granted the Supreme Court the final word on constitu-
tional issues, but this still left the question whether it was constitu-
tional, or discreet, for the Court to try to arbitrate certain major
political issues involving powers of the other branches of the Govern-
ment. In the Sunakawa case, where the lower court"8 had held the
U.S./Japanese Security Treaty unconstitutional under Article 9, the
court reversed by invoking the "political question" doctrine, saying
the case must be regarded "as having a highly political nature which,
... possesses an extremely important relation to the existence of our
country as a sovereign nation."49
"The ji5kokn appeal is a second appeal on questions of law only as opposed to the
k6so appeal, which is the first appeal from the trial court judgment. The court of
ktso appeal has power to review both questions of law and fact when presented by
the appellant. CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE arts. 378 et seq., cf. art. 394. See MAKI, at xxv.
"See Yokota, Political Questions and Judicial Review: A Comparison, in this sym-
posium p. 1031 infra. By Japanese scholars, the terms, "political question" (seiii ,,ion-
dai) of American origin and "act of government" (tLchi k~i) of French origin, are
used as rough equivalents, but in content of course Japanese and American political
questions, as developed by the cases, respectively are different. We are therefore using
"political question" here to refer to the Japanese. See H. Itoh, The Japanese Supreme
Court: Judicial Decision Making Analysis (unpublished thesis, Univ. of Wash., 1968).
'" 13 KeishR 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959).
17See pp. 1006-09 supra.
"
8 Japan v. Sakata, 13 Keishft 3305 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Nov. 30, 1959) [hereinafter
referred to as Sunakawa].
" 13 Keishfi at 3234-35, English translation in MAKI, at 305.
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But this use and recognition of the doctrine as a restraint on its
own power becomes somewhat equivocal a few lines later in the
opinion:50
Consequently, the legal decision as to constitutionality has a character
which, as a matter of principle, is not adaptable to review by a judicial
court, which has as its mission a purely judicial function; accordingly,
it falls outside the right of judicial review by the courts, unless there is
clearly obvious unconstitutionality or invalidity.
Several other cases have advanced and- refined the Japanese political
question doctrine as explained in detail in an article by former Chief
Justice Kisabur6 Yokota, assisted by Hiroshi Itoh and Charles
Routh.51
It i§ interesting to note in passing, however, that one Supreme Court
Justice (Kotani) 2 as well as several scholars 53 have opposed the rec-
ognition of any such "political questions" as falling outside the scope
of judicial review. One argument against the doctrine is based on an
interpretation of Article 81. The political question doctrine is ration-
alized as a limitation inherent in the nature of judicial power as under-
stood in the Western countries of its origin. Therefore Article 81, being
a special grant of power, removes this inherent limitation and confers
upon the Japanese Supreme Court the power to decide all constitu-
tional issues, regardless of their political character.
The court has answered a fourth question regarding its new powers:
Does the judicial review envisaged by Article 81 extend to treaties?
An important subsidiary question is the effect of Article 98 on the
issue. This subject has been more fully treated by Professor Isao
Sato. 4 Generally treaties are held to be reviewable, except where they
overlap with the political question doctrine as was found in the Suna-
kawa case. There the Supreme Court, reversing the lower court, re-
fused to review the U.S./Japanese Security Treaty under the Constitu-
tion (Article 9), holding that it involved a political question. There
has also been a rather strong contrary view among some scholars to
the effect that treaties as effective international law commitments are
not reviewable based on their construction of Article 81, which does
rW Id. at 3235.
In this symposium at p. 1031.13 Keishfi at 3234, English translation in MAKI, att 341.
IT. ISOZAKI, T6cHi KOI-SETSU HIHAw 72 (1965); Ukai, Saibanken to kokka nojishusei, 26 HORTrsU IIH5 (No. 8) 29 (1954).
r' See his article in this symposium p. 1057.
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not use the word "treaties," and Article 98(2)," which, they empha-
size, sets out treaties separately from the "law," which is expressly
subordinated to the Constitution in Article 98(1).
A fifth question arose as to whether lower court decisions could be
declared unconstitutional as an "official act" (shobun) under Article
81. Again, this becomes a question in cases such as mentioned above
where the High Courts (k&tt saibansho) are otherwise the final courts
for j.hkoku appeal. The question then is: Can the Supreme Court re-
gard such a High Court judgment as an "official act" under Article 81
and thus review it for compliance with the Constitution? The answer
was affirmative in Komatsu v. Japan.56 A transitional statute, assign-
ing a case from the old court system to the new one, was challenged,
for giving the Supreme Court the power of constitutional review over
jdkoku appeals of the High Courts, though they would have been other-
wise unreviewable by the Supreme Court in the usual appellate hierar-
chy. The statute was upheld, but one might wonder whether the court
should not have had the same power without it. Also, a lower court de-
cision was held "unconstitutional" in Nomura v. Yamaki ;5 7 ironically,
it was unconstitutional for following a prior Supreme Court precedent,"8
because the Supreme Court decided, for the first time in a civil case, to
overrule the prior precedent. Rather than declare the statutes involved
unconstitutional, it found the lower court's statutory interpretation
erroneous amounting to a deprivation of constitutional right.
Thus out of the general language of Article 81 and other constitu-
tional provisions, the Supreme Court has fashioned several doctrines
useful in exercising its new powers of judicial review over official acts
and statutes. In the next section we will scrutinize in detail the only
two cases wherein the Court has actually declared statutes unconstitu-
tional up to 1967.
III. THE JAPANESE CASE LAW ON JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION
We have seen that, despite Japanese scholarly advocates of a conti-
nental-style "constitutional court," the Japanese Supreme Court de-
cided in Suzuki v. Japan to administer its new powers of judicial re-
See Sat6, Treaties and the Constitution, in this symposium p. 1057 infra.
' 2 Keishfi 801, 806 (Sup. Ct., July 8, 1948).
' 14 Minshfi 1657 (Sup. Ct., G.B., July 6, 1960). Justices Kawamura and Ikeda,
concurring, asserted that the statute, Wartime Law art. 19, was unconstitutional,
rather than unconstitutionally construed and applied as held by the majority. 14
Minshfi 1657, 1669 and 1673 respectively. Justice Kotani, concurring, asserted that
Monetary Law art. 7 was unconstitutional. 14 Minshfi 1657, 1669.
'See D. HENDERSON, CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW Ch. 9 (1967) for a de-
tailed analysis of both cases.
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view over legislation (1) only in the regular courts of law and (2) only
as legislation might be challenged for unconstitutionality in "cases or
controversies" brought to the court by (3) proper disputing parties. It
is difficult to exaggerate the comparative law importance of this recent
case law, for it not only directed Japanese judicial growth along lines
familiar to American lawyers, but it also restricted the flow of consti-
tutional challenges to the usual channels of litigation-a result which
will tend to emphasize case law and presages some significant shifts
in Japanese practice as to sources of law and juristic method generally.
Indeed these trends are clearly discernible in the legal literature of the
past decade producing a most interesting blend of case law and syste-
matic analysis, indicating that Japanese lawyers are making the best
of both worlds-common law and civil law.
Sakagami v. Japan" was the first case where a Diet enactment, ap-
plicable in the case, was held unconstitutional. In a sense it may be
regarded as Japan's Marbury v. Madison," but its value as precedent
is diminished by the numerous opinions written by the justices, by the
decision's consequent overall ambiguity, and by the fact that the un-
constitutional statute involved merely extended the validity of Cabinet
Orders in turn issued originally to implement SCAP directives which
were by then inapplicable, except possibly to offenses, such as the one
in this case, committed prior to the Peace Treaty (April 28, 1952). It
was not until 1962 in a second case, Nakamura v. Japan," that the
'7 Minshdi 1562 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Oct. 8, 1953), English translation in Cases and
Materials for an Introductory Course on Japanese Law ch. II (mimeo) (Henderson
ed. 1967). Also in English, Judgment Upon Case of Validity of Cabinet Order No.
325 of 1950 (General Affairs Bureau, General Secretariat, Supreme Court ed.);
Prominent Judgments of tire Supreme Court upon Questions of Constitutionality (No.
1, 1954). Comments: 15 KEijI HANREI HY6SHAKUSHiY 223 (1960) (comment Ono);
HANERI TAIMUZU (No. 30) 16 (1953) (comment Taniguchi); JuaxsuTo (No. 41) 2(1953) (comment Mano) ; 25 H6aRTsu jin6 888 (1953) (comment Ono).
€'5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).6t Nakamura v. Japan, 16 Minshii 1593 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Nov. 28, 1962), English
translation in Cases and Materials for an Introductory Course on Japanese Law
ch. II (mimeo) (Henderson ed., 1967), modifying and overruling in part points in
Omachi v. Japan, 14 Keishdi 1574 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Oct. 19, 1960). Comments on the
Nakamura case: Kemnpi hanrei hyakusen 76 (comment Hirano), JunisuTo (special
issue) (June 1963) ; JURIsUTo (No. 266) 48 (1963), also JuoisTro (No. 338) 45-49(1966) (notes Taniguchi); JURISUTrO (No. 228) 10 (1963) (note Kiyomiya); 80
H6GAKU KYSKAr ZASSHr (comment George); 32 KEIsATsu KENKYU 1, 2 (comment
Usui); cf. companion cases, Kunihiro v. Japan, 16 Keishi! 1577 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 28,
1962) and Mihara v. Japan, 16 Keishfi 1672 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 12, 1962), which invali-
dated confiscations under old laws which were not effective prospectively at the time of
decision, though they would have been applicable to the defendant, had they not been
unconstitutional. In this sense they are comparable to the Sakagamni case, note 59
supra; Kinjo v. Japan, 11 Keishi! 3133 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 27, 1957), Omachi v. Japan,
14 Keishi! 1574 (Sup. Ct, G.B., Oct. 10, 1960), Shimuzu v. Japan, 14 Keishfr 1611(Sup. Ct., Oct. 19, 1960), JuRISUTrO (No. 215) 68 (1960) (note Judge Tatsuoka),
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Japanese Supreme Court first declared unconstitutional a statute
which was still prospectively applicable at the time of the decision.
Of course, previously the Court had upheld statutes against chal-
lenges of unconstitutionality, and lower courts had held several stat-
utes and orders unconstitutional, only to be reversed. 2 Also several
concurring or dissenting justices had written 'opinions in Supreme
Court cases, asserting that certain statutes were unconstitutional."
However, since the Sakagami and Nakamura cases have set new
benchmarks in over a century of rising judicial power in Japan, they
are worth setting out in some detail so that the concrete approach and
subtlety of reasoning of the Japanese justices can be appreciated.
In Sakagami v. Japan,64 the issue was the constitutionality of stat-
utes passed at the time of the Japanese Peace Treaty. The statutes
were intended to extend the effect of a complex series of Imperial Or-
dinances, Cabinet Orders and SCAP Directives6" under which the
defendant, Sakagami, had been convicted in the District Court (af-
firmed in the Sendai High Court) for illegal publication of a commu-
Kitaoka v. Japan, 15 Keishfi 1854 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 14, 1961), JURISUTO (No. 248) 20
(1962) (comment Taniguchi).
'2E.g., Yamato v. Japan, 4 Keisha 2037 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Oct. 11, 1950), quashing
and returning a Fukuoka District Court holding to the effect that Criminal Code
art. 205(2) was unconstitutional for prescribing a heavier penalty for injury causing
death of a lineal ascendant or spouse than for injuries causing death to others.
'E.g., in Nomura v. Yamaki, 14 Minshfi 1657 (Sup. Ct., G.B., July, 1960) at 1669
(J. Kawamura) and at 1673 (J. Ikeda) and at 1669 (J. Kotani) ; Yoneuchiyama v.
Japan, 7 Minshfi 43 (Sup. Ct., April 28, 1952) (J. Mano).
647 Minshfi 1562 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Oct. 8, 1953).
'The legislative scheme involved in the transition from the allied occupation to
complete Japanese government autonomy was underlying the specific statutes chal-
lenged in this case. The Potsdam Declaration (See SUPREME COMMAND ALLIED POW-
ERS, POLITICAL REORIENTATION OF JAPAN 1945-1948 (Appendices) 413 (1948)) was
accepted by Japan as a basis for the Japanese Instrument of Surrender signed Sept.
2, 1945 (see id. 419) and the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers was to direct
the Japanese government to achieve the goals of surrender. To comply with these
Japanese obligations to SCAP, Imperial Ordinance 542, Sept. 20, 1945, entitled Pots-
darn sengen no judaku ni tomonai hassnru lneirei ni kansurn ken (Concerning orders
to be issued accompanying acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration) authorized the
Japanese government to issue regulations and penal orders as necessary to effectuate
SCAP demands implementing the surrender and the Potsdam Declaration. Cabinet
Order 325 (Nov. 1, 1950) under consideration here (entitled Senry3 mokuiteki sogai
kcsi shobatsn-rei (Order for the punishment of acts prejudicial to occupation objec-
tives) was one of the cabinet orders passed under Imperial Order 542, and it pro-
vided penalties for any "act prejudicial to occupation objectives," which meant for
purposes of this case, acts violating any SCAP directive to the Japanese government.
In other words, the content of punishable crimes under Cabinet Order 325 could only
be determined by reference to the effective SCAP directives at the time. The SCAP
directives violated by defendant in this case were SCAP bans placed on the communist
paper, Akahata (Red Flag) or its successors:
1) Akahata no 30 nichikan hakki5 teishi ni kansurt MacArthur gensui no nai-
kakn soridaijin ateno shokan (Message from General MacArthur to the Prime
Minister, dated June 26, 1950, concerning the suspension of publication of Akahato
for 30 days) ;
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nist newspaper. The Supreme Court in a ten to four decision reversed
and acquitted Sakagami. With seven different opinions filed, and with
a variety of theoretical,66 constitutional and legal issues raised, and
viewed differently, by the several opinions, the case is difficult to
appraise. Nevertheless, the Japanese Supreme Court did hold for the
first time that statutes of the Japanese Diet were unconstitutional,
resulting in the reversal of the conviction. And since the statue had
effect, if at all, only for past offenses and therefore the case involved
little chance for friction between the Diet and the Court, it was an
opportune occasion for the initial exercise of the Court's new power
with a minimum of political risk.
Sakagami was convicted for publishing a paper called Heiwa no koe,
in violation of a SCAP directive banning publication of the Akahata
(Red Flag), a communist newspaper, or its successor. The whole legal
2) Akahata oyobi sono kikeishi narabini d5ruishi no vnukigen hakka teishi ,i
kansurn MacArthur gensui no naikaku saridaijin ate shokan (Message from
General MacArthur to the Prime Minister, dated July 18, 1950, concerning the
indefinite suspension of publication of Akahata, successors of Akahata, and the
like).
The violation occurred January 2-25, 1951, and the judgment at first instance (Mori-
oka Dist. Ct., June 25, 1951) was rendered April 28, 1952. After the Sendai High
Court affirmed the District Court on appeal, the Supreme Court decided the jokoku
appeal, on July 22, 1953. In the interim the Japanese Peace Treaty became effective
April 28, 1952. The occupation ended and SCAP was dissolved on the same date,
along with all of its directives and other legal authority. Dovetailed with the peace
treaty was a Law No. 81, April 28, 1952, entitled Potsdam sengen no judaku ni tomno-
nai hassuru ineirei ni kansurn ken no haishi ni kansurn hLritsn (The law concerning
the abrogation of "Concerning orders to be issued accompanying acceptance of the
Potsdam declaration"), which repealed Imperial Ordinance 542, but provided that
orders issued under it would remain effective for 180 days from April 28, 1952, unless
some other laws provided otherwise. Such a law was enacted May 7, 1952 (Law No.
137) entitled Potsdam sengen no judaku iti tomnonai hassurn ineirei iti kansurn ken id
inotozuku h6musho kankei shohorei no sochi ,i kansuru horitsu (The law concerning
the disposition of related statutes in the Department of Justice: In connection with
the "Concerning orders to be issued accompany the acceptance of the Potsdam dec-
laration") [hereinafter Law 137]; it repealed Cabinet Order 325 and provided "the
application of penal provision to acts committed before enforcement of this Law shall
continue in the same manner as formerly." The questions then were whether Laws 81
and 137 prolonged the validity of penalties under Cabinet Order 325 or the validity
(as against the effects of Criminal Code art. 6 or Criminal Procedure Code article
337) of subsidiary SCAP directives banning the defendant's publication at least so far
as the directive and order applied to acts committed before the Peace Treaty became
effective April 28, 1952.
'The chief theoretical question involved the prewar German concept of zeitgesetz
meaning a law with a fixed period of validity. One of the special characteristics of
zeitgesetz was that their penal provisions are applied, even after their validity for
future offenses ends, to offenses committed while they were effective. Thus, if Order
No. 325 were classified here as a zeitgestz, then Criminal Code art. 6 and Criminal
Procedure Code art. 337(ii) are inapplicable and will not prevent enforcement of the
penalties against Sakagami for his offense prior to abolishing Order 325. In other
words, as a matter of legal theory the penalties may persist for prior offenses even
after the law ends (or even becomes unconstitutional for future cases) unless there is
a specific legal waiver. See concurring opinion of Justice Mano opposing this view at
7 Keishil 1562, 1586 (Sup. Ct., G.B., July 22, 1953).
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structure, fashioned to implement the occupation, was finally held by
the Japanese Supreme Court in Hasegawa v. Japan7 to provide for
the operation of SCAP (and the Japanese government when support-
ing SCAP) during the allied occupation quite outside of the Japanese
Constitution (kemp6-gai), of either 1889 or 1947.
This latter point was significant to Sakagami because he argued that
once the peace treaty was signed April 28, 1952, the Constitution alone
governed, and regulations "outside the Constitution" were thenceforth
forbidden; the authority of SCAP and all SCAP-based law were there-
fore simultaneously dissolved; all governmental action was imme-
diately subject only to constitutional standards. But the Japanese gov-
ernment, apparently feeling that some or all current SCAP regulations
might be useful temporarily even after the Treaty, enacted the two
interim laws (No. 81 and No. 137) challenged in this case. Law No.
81 repealed Imperial Ordinance No. 542 but extended the Cabinet
Orders issued under it (including No. 325 involved here) for 180 days.
But then a few days later the Diet passed Law No. 137 repealing
Cabinet Order 325, but provided: "The application of penal provisions
to acts done before enforcement of the law shall be in the same man-
ner as formerly."
Besides the foregoing statutory pattern, there was an important
timing sequence as shown by the following events:
Imperial Ordinance No. 542 Sept. 20, 1945
Cabinet Order No. 325 Nov. 1, 1950
SCAP Directives banning
communist papers June 26 and July 18. 1950
Sakagami published Heiwa no koe January 2-25, 1951
Trial below completed April 28, 1952
Peace Treaty effective April 28, 1952
Law No. 81 Retaining Order 325
in support of SCAP directives April 28, 1952
Law No. 137 repealing Order 325 but
applying its penalties to acts pre-dating treaty May 7, 1952
Supreme Court Decision July 22, 1953
Since Sakagami's violation pre-dated the Treaty, the question was
whether Law No. 81 and Law No. 137 were constitutional in attempt-
ing to extend Cabinet Order 325 and penalties under it to offenses
committed before the Treaty, but tried or appealed after the Treaty.
If these statutes were constitutional and applicable, the conviction
77 Keishfi 775, 787-788 (Sup. Ct., G.B., April 8, 1953).
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should have been upheld, but since the majority found them unconsti-
tutional, the court reversed the conviction.
But the "majority" was composed of two groups which disagreed
on the basis for holding the statutes unconstitutional. Six of the jus-
tices (Mano, Kotani, Shima, Fujita, Tanimura and Irie) decided to
reverse the conviction as based on statutes unconstitutional per se,
because of positive-law formalities of timing (i.e., when the treaty
began the occupation and its law ended because they did not comply
with the Constitution and could no longer operate "outside the Con-
stitution"), nor could the new laws save them. They held that Law
No. 81 was unconstitutional because it extended Cabinet Order No.
325 penalizing violations of SCAP directives, but it did not extend
the effect of said directives so that the cabinet order, standing alone,
was open-ended and meaningless. Their reasons why by interpretation
the directives should not have been deemed incorporated by reference
or still effective until nullified as others argued is not clear in their
opinion. Similarly formalistic was the argument of these six justices
regardiing the unconstitutionality of Law No. 137. They said that,
since Order No. 325 lost its effect with the enforcement of the Peace
Treaty, Law No. 137 would be an ex post facto law in attempting to
apply penalties from the date of its enactment on May 7, 1952, back-
wards to acts committed before (presumably because of the nine-day
gap, April 28 to May 7, 1952), thus violating the Japanese Constitu-
tion Article 39.O8 These six justices found it unnecessary to consider
substantively whether the SCAP directives placing a ban on commu-
nist papers was constitutional by post-treaty standards (i.e., after
these directives were no longer permitted to operate "outside of the
Constitution").
The four justices of the second group in the majority (Inoue, Kuri-
yama, Kawamura, and Kobayashi) held that Cabinet Order No. 325
need not automatically dissolve after the treaty, because some of its
effect (through SCAP directives then in fixed and final form) might
be as useful to the Japanese public welfare as to SCAP. Thus these
justices found the directives still effective to the extent they were then
consistent with the Japanese Constitution, though this opinion is not
clear either as to whether their theory was one of incorporation of the
directives by reference to Cabinet Order No. 325 or Law No. 81, or
JAPANESE CONST. art. 39: No person shall be held criminally liable for an act
which was lawful at the time it was committed, or of which he has been acquitted,
nor shall he be placed in double jeopardy.
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whether they remain effective automatically until repealed. But since
they were considered effective, if constitutional, the next question was
whether the law was consistent with the Japanese Constitution Article
21 protecting freedom of expression. The four justices then held that
the ban was an unconstitutional blanket prohibition worse than cen-
sorship. So the directive and Cabinet Order 325 were both unconstitu-
tional; and Law No. 81, seeking to extend Order 325, as well as Law
No. 137, article 3, repealing No. 235 but seeking to retain its penal-
ties for punishment of prior acts, were also both unconstitutional on
substantive grounds. Accordingly they reversed on the statutory
grounds that Code of Criminal Procedure Article 337 requires acquittal
when the penalty has been abolished after the decision below, as was
the result here.
We do not know how many of the six justices who decided on
formalistic or per se grounds might have sided with the dissenters on
the substantive grounds (i.e., whether the ban on communist papers
violated Article 21 of the Constitution). Indeed one dissenter, Justice
Sait6, in a separate opinion,6" argued that since the two groups in the
majority, though agreeing on reversal for unconstitutionality, did not
agree on the basis of their respective decisions, and that the lower
court decision should therefore have been upheld for lack of a major-
ity to reverse. Justice Sait6's argument raised a question which has
been discussed some by scholars as to whether a vote of the justices
should be first taken as to the desired result in the whole case, or
whether the justices should vote on each preliminary point in logical
order and be bound at each stage by that majority vote in deciding
on the next point. Clearly the result would sometimes differ depending
on which voting procedure was followed.7 ' Apparently the Japanese
court votes German-style, by stages, as did the prior Great Court of
Cassation; unlike the Great Court of Cassation each justice expresses
his differences with the majority opinion in a concurring or dissenting
opinion.7
1
The dissenters (Chief Justice Tanaka and Justices Shimoyama,
Sait6 and Motomura) based their opinion on a timing analysis, mainly
on the point that the law providing for penalties for offenses occurring
before the treaty was validly applied to such offenses, even by a court
' 7 Keishfi 1585 (Sup. Ct., G.B., July 22, 1953). See also Tanaka, Mittsn-ij5 1,o
iken no tairitsu: saik~sai no hydketsu no hho, 29 H6RITSU JIH6 728 (1957).
" Ueki v. Japan, 109 Saibanshfi keiji 341 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Oct. 12, 1955).
" H. Itoh, Japanese Supreme Court: Judicial Decision Making Analysis, 85 and
112-114 (unpublished thesis, Univ. of Wash., 1968).
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sitting later, unless the penalties were intentionally abolished by law.
Contrariwise, they argued, the penalties were specifically not abol-
ished by Law No. 137. So, although Law No. 81 might be unconstitu-
tional to extend the penalty to post-treaty cases, it was not unconstitu-
tional to apply the law, even after it might become unconstitutional
for prospective effect, to offenses committed while it was effective and
thus constitutional.
Also, the dissenters stated that the lower court finding that the
defendant's publication was subversive and, therefore, not protected
expression could not be questioned in a j6koku appeal.
In the second case, Nakamura v. Japanr72 the Japanese Supreme
Court for the first time declared a statute unconstitutional which was
prospectively effective at the time of the decision. The defendants,
Nakamura and others, had attempted to smuggle 18 bales of textiles
owned by a third party from Osaka to Korea, but they were driven
back to Fukuoka, Japan, by bad weather and apprehended, tried and
convicted in the Fukuoka District Court.73 They were sentenced to
imprisonment with suspended sentences, and under Customs Law
Article 118(1), the third party's goods were confiscated, along with
defendant's boat. The Fukuoka High Court74 affirmed, and defendant
filed a jakoku appeal with the Japanese Supreme Court, arguing in
part that confiscation of goods of a third party, who had not been
given notice or a hearing, was unconstitutional under Articles 29 and
31 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed the imprisonment
convictions, but reversed the decision ordering confiscation of the third
party's property, seeming to hold, though the precise ratio decidendi is
difficult to ascertain,75 that in the absence of statutory procedures to
give such a third party due notice and a chance to be heard, article
118(1) violated Constitution Articles 31 and 29, even though article
118(1) might be constitutional as a substantive provision.
This case is not only important as the first decision where the court
declared a presently effective act of the Diet unconstitutional, but also,
"16 Keishii 1593 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Nov. 28, 1962).
"Id. at 1629.
71 Id. at 1630.
"See JuRIsuTo (No. 268) 10, 12 (1963), where Professor Kiyomiya suggests that
the court is saying in Nakamura that both the statutes (art. 118(1)) and the disposi-
tion (shoburi), confiscating third-party property, are unconstitutional; Professor J.
Tanaka then suggests it is not the (substantive) statute, but the statute's lack of a
procedure complying with constitutional standards of notice and a hearing which is
unconsitutional, and Professor R. Hirano seems to agree; Professor Ashibe disagrees,




in its eight separate opinions, it gives us an opportunity to observe the
nuances of reasoning by the several Japanese justices, grappling with
the very nature of judicial power. The difficulties they were experienc-
ing were attested by the fact that the Court modified or overruled a
position it had taken two years earlier to the effect that such a confis-
cation could not be attacked on appeal by a defendant on the basis of
a third party's constitutional rights.7"
Looking at the major opinions in the order in which they appear in
the Reporter we find that the majority declares Customs Law Article
118(1) unconstitutional because it feels that the confiscation judg-
ment had the effect in fact of transferring the property from the third
party to the state, and such a transfer of property could not take
place without "due process" (Constitution Article 31), requiring
notice and a hearing for .the non-party owner. No such hearing was
provided for the third party owner in the procedural law; therefore,
article 118(1), lacking such complementary procedure and authoriz-
ing confiscation without it, is unconstitutional. On the issue of de-
fendant's standing to raise a third party's constitutional rights, the
Court also says that to take the property from the possession of the
defendant was an additional penalty against him (i.e., lost possession
plus risking a claim by the owner); hence defendant had sufficient
interest to invoke the violation of the third party's constitutional
rights.
Justice Irie filed a concurring opinion7" which reasserts his dissent-
ing position in the Ornachi case with due consistency, but he stresses
that, since Omachi, he has changed his mind on one point: now he
believes that simply calling the third party as a witness,78 as he sug-
gested in Omachi, would be insufficient; the third party owner must
be summoned as a party. Justice Irie also stresses the point that
Article 31 guarantees both substantive and procedural rights (like
the Meiji Constitution Article 23).
Justice Tarumi7 9 concurs but emphasizes a substantive-procedural
dichotomy. He insists that in order to comply with constitutional
standards, laws providing for confiscation of third party property
7 Omachi v. Japan, 14 Keisha 1574 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 19, 1960).
16 Keish5 1593, 1598.
Yoshida v. Japan, 19 Keisha 203 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 28, 1965), HANREI JIH6
(No. 407) 19 (1965), reversing a collection of money from a third party in lieu of
confiscation from him (tsuich5), even though the third party had appeared as a -wit-
ness, but not as a party.7' 16 Keishfi 1593, 1601.
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must not only require fault on the part of the third party as a matter
of substantive law, but must provide proper procedures such as notice
and a fair hearing. In other words, a forfeiture law, even though sub-
stantively constitutional, cannot be constitutionally applied without
procedures for notice and a hearing.
Also, Justice Okuno asserts that article 497 of the Criminal Pro-
cedure Code conferring a right to recover property, does not apply to
the third party owner here because to come under article 497 the
taking must have occurred under the mistaken understanding that the
property belonged to the defendant.
The dissents, focusing on the basic nature of judicial power, raise
several questions. Does the defendant have standing to assert consti-
tutional rights of a third party, even though the law, thus attacked,
is constitutional as applied to defendant? Justices Fujitas° and Shi-
moiizakaO' say no, though the latter allows for exceptions where the
third party is unable to assert the right himself. Is there a "case or
controversy" regarding the third party's right, when the defendant,
as the only party before the court, either suffers no legal loss, or loses
possession, if at all, only after defendant has been fully notified and
heard? Justice Shimoiizaka s2 sees no case or controversy here. Would
a judgment in a proceeding against the defendant purporting to de-
prive a third party owner of his property without notice or a hearing
be res judicata in an action by the third party to regain the property,
i.e., can the judgment actually reach the third party? Justice Yamadae5
answers in the negative, asserting that no principle is more funda-
mental to procedural law than the proposition that a judgment binds
only parties before the court by virtue of minimal contacts, notice or
the like. By inference Shimoiizaka seems to support this position
because, disagreeing with Okuno, he believes that the third party
can recover the property from the State under article 497.
Both Okuno and Shimoiizaka refer to cases of the U.S. Supreme
Court, but they do not cite what cases they are quoting or relying on."4
In summary the majority in Nakamura v. Japan seems to declare
article 118(1) of the Customs Law unconstitutional, because it is
10 Id. at 1593, 1608.
"Id. at 1593, 1612.
' id. at 1593, 1609.
'Id. at 1593, 1616; see also Justice Yamada's consistent and persuasive concurring
opinion in Yoshida v. Japan, 19 Keishfi 203 (Sup. Ct., G.B., April 28, 1965) and dis-
senting in Matsuyama v. Japan, 19 Keishii 300 (Sup. Ct, G. B., April 28, 1965).
" Compare People v. Broad, 216 Cal. 1, 12 P.2d 941 (1932) (confiscation of a third
party's automobile found unconstitutional).
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construed to support the lower court's judgment confiscating the
third party's property without a hearing. Such a deprivation of third
party property without "due process" violates Articles 21 and 31 of
the Constitution and can be attacked by the defendant.
On the other hand, the dissenters assert that the majority gratui-
tously made a constitutional issue of the case; the matter should have
been handled as a simple procedural matter based on proper concep-
tions of the inherent limits of judicial power. Since a court can neither
decide a hypothetical case; nor hear a party assert another's rights
for his own benefit; nor render a judgment binding on a party not
before it, this confiscation judgment only affects the defendant, de-
priving him only of what he has, possession-and quite properly so,
because he has been notified and heard. This limited effect is legally
correct even though the procurators and bailiffs may have intramural
practices lingering from prewar days for enforcing such judgments
illegally against third party owners. Such excesses can be corrected
when the third party brings an action to recover his property, if
indeed he dares to appear and assert that he was unaware of the use
of his property in the crime.
After reflecting on the various opinions, one can conclude that this
first Japanese exercise in judicial review invalidating an effective
statute was quite unnecessary. The analyses of the dissenters Fujita,
Shimoiizaka and particularly Yamada, are quite persuasive in fixing
the constitutional scope of judicial power. By confining the court's
powers within the concepts of (1) "case or controversy," or (2)
proper parties to raise the question of constitutional rights or (3) the
binding scope of the judgment, the dissenters proposed to avoid a
constitutional issue in this case by simply depriving the defendant of
possession, as was clearly within their constitutional power, or by
denying him standing to litigate the rights of a third party on an
abstract point. The third party owner could always assert his right
to the property, and if he did not do so, the law need not be con-
cerned with his lack of concern for his property. This proposed result,
besides standing up analytically, achieves specific justice in the case,
since the defendant would have incurred, without deprivation of due
process, the additional penalty duly imposed by the substantive law,
and the third party would have title and possession at such time as
he appeared to take responsibility for it. Surely these results against
both defendant and the third party are preferable to leaving the
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property in the hands of the convict, as seems to have been done by
the Court here.
As noted, the Supreme Court rules85 require the Supreme Court to
notify the Cabinet when a statute is held to be unconstitutional, and
our search indicates that this is the first instance where such a report
was made to the Cabinet and Diet. In the Sakagami and Kunihiro
cases, the statutes were already ineffective for future cases; so no
formal report was made.
Soon after this decision the Diet passed a statute 6 providing for
procedures to notify and hear third party owners in confiscation
cases.87 However, the statute was narrowly drawn, and it does not
provide procedures to cover a case where a money fine equivalent in
value to the property is taxed against a third party owner in cases
where the property cannot be confiscated. For example, in Yoshida v.
Japan8 the Supreme Court reversed a judgment assessing the value
of a bribe against a third-party recipient because the lower court
failure to give the third-party recipient a hearing rendered the judg-
ment under article 197-4 of the Criminal Code unconstitutional. 9
The lower court judgment, ordering the third party to pay even
though he had received no notice or hearing, apparently was regarded
as a violation of Article 29 and Article 31 of the Constitution. It is
not clear in the opinion whether, like Customs Law Article 118(1) in
Nakamura article 197-4 of the Criminal Code was unconstitutional
for lack of procedures, but it is clear that the interim legislation
passed to fill the procedural gap exposed in the Nakamura case did
not solve the procedural problems in these cases of third party assess-
'Saiko saibansho jimiu shori kisoku (Regulations for Disposition of Supreme
Court Affairs) (Sup. Ct. Reg. No. 6, Nov. 11, 1947), art. 12: "Eight or more judges
must agree when a judgment declaring laws, orders, regulations or official acts un-
constitutional is rendered." Art. 14: "When a judgment under Art. 12 is rendered,
its holding shall be publicly announced in the Official Gazette and the original of the
written judgment shall be sent to the Cabinet." If the judgment has held a statute
unconstitutional, the original of the written judgment must be sent to the Diet also.
'Keiji jiken ni okeru daisansha shoyfibutsu no bosshii tetsuzuki ni kansurit okya
sochiho (Temporary law concerning confiscation procedure in criminal cases for
goods owned by a third person). (Law No. 138, July 12, 1963), 10 GaNo HOI<i
(SuxH6) (No. 2) 1748.
'
1See Tsai P'ei-nan v. Japan, HAmNzI jmb (No. 445) 15-18 (1966), where the
Supreme Court upheld the Osaka High Court's decision holding a confiscation invalid
for failing to follow the duly enacted procedures of Law No. 138 (July 12, 1963)
article 3(1). The defendant and the third party's interest could not be confiscated
with a hearing.
' 19 Keishfil 203 (Sup. Ct, G.B., April 28, 1965).
' CUINAi. CoDE art 197-4: A bribe received by an offender or by a third person
having knowledge of its nature shall be confiscated. If the confiscation of the
whole or a portion of the bribe is impossible, the value thereof shall be collected.
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ment (tsuichd) in lieu of confiscation, even though the article of the
Customs Law involved in Nakamura used the tsuickd device."
A second tsuichd case91 decided on the same day as Yoshida is puz-
zling because the Supreme Court upheld the conviction even though
the third party had not been made a party. The result, otherwise
inconsistent with Yoshida, seemed to rest on the fact that the defend-
ant was the representative of the third party (the Uzumasa branch
of the Kyoto agricultural cooperative) which received a bribe, and
apparently the defendant was regarded as speaking for the cooperative
also. Still the result is difficult to accept and Justice Yamada's and
Justice Matsuda's dissents are most persuasive.
Both of the complex cases reviewed above and their aftermath
provide more stimulus for further analyses than clear answers for the
future shape of Japanese judicial review. These cases, along with
others discussed in Part II herein, however, have established a back-
ground on which the courts can further clarify the ideas introduced
in the several opinions. Once a court opts against constitutional
review in the abstract, it grows with experience in defining (1) how
it will exercise judiciary power, (2) against whom, and (3) to what
effect.
IV. CONCLUSION
The 1947 Constitution greatly enhanced Japanese judicial powers:
(1) the courts were separated from the executive branch and no longer
subjected to the administrative supervision of the Ministry of Justice;
(2) the Meiji administrative court was abolished and the law courts
with the Supreme Court at the apex were empowered to decide all
cases in both public and private law; (3) the Supreme Court was
given rule making power to determine its own procedural and operat-
ing rules; (4) the Supreme Court was also made the court of last
resort to determine questions of constitutionality of statutes and other
official acts; (5) and no special courts were to be established.
The implementation of this new power has posed a number of
' CUSTOI.Is LAW art. 118(2) : When the criminal cargo that should be confiscated
under the provision of the preceding paragraph cannot be confiscated or when the
criminal cargo is not confiscated according to the provisions of item 2 of that
paragraph, an amount equivalent to the value (kakaku) at the time when the
crime was committed of such criminal cargo that cannot be confiscated or is not
confiscated shall be collected as an additional penalty (tsuich5) from the criminal.
" Matsuyama v. Japan, 19 Keishfi 300 (Sup. Ct., G.B., April 28, 1965) ; 17 H6s6
JiiH 1452 (1965) (comment Nishikawa).
[ VOL. 43 : 1005
LEGISLATION
intricate problems, and for their solution the legacy from the prewar
era has provided support in at least two important respects: (1) the
traditional sociality of the Japanese people-the capacity for rational
pursuit of collective values has served them well in achieving a new
value: the maximum respect for the individual; (2) the sophisticated
legal theory, nurtured and expanded from civil-law borrowings before
the war, is now flowering into a refined but practical legal science
using more case law and based on a cooperative effort of the entire
legal profession.
The Supreme Court has answered, case by case, a number of impor-
tant subsidiary questions in the past two decades: (1) judicial review
will be exercised only in "cases or controversies"; (2) the lower
courts share this power to review for constitutionality in the course
of deciding cases before them; (3) political questions are not review-
able; (4) treaties are subject to judicial review; (5) and lower court
decisions may be declared unconstitutional.
The major debate has centered around the role of the Supreme
Court in exercising its new powers of judicial review over statutes. In
the early years, some writers supported the idea of a special "consti-
tutional court" which could review a statute in the abstract. However,
by 1952, the Supreme Court had decided in favor of a "case or con-
troversy" context for judicial review, and this approach, similar to
the American method, has prevailed since. Nonetheless, the practice
of reporting unconstitutional statutes to the Diet and a tendency to
regard statutes found unconstitutional in one case to be per se uncon-
stitutional, as well as original doubts as to whether lower courts had
powers of judicial review and also arguments that even "political
questions" were reviewable, seem to be vestiges of the continental
notion, strengthened by certain constructions of Article 81 of the
Constitution, that statutes can be reviewed in the abstract.
In addition, close readings of Sakagami v. Japan and Nakamura v.
Japan, the first cases declaring statutes unconstitutional, reveal that
several problems remain to be settled on a case by case basis. For
example, dissenting opinions of Justices Shimoiizaka and Yamada in
Nakamura seem quite persuasive to a "case or controversy" lawyer.
For in Nakamura the Court apparently overlooked the usual strictures
regarded as inherent in judicial power and declared an act unconstitu-
tional for the commendable purpose of protecting a third party against
failures of due process. But the third party needed protection only
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because the Court presumed to bind him when he was not "before
the court," and, furthermore, the Court's dilemma was posed by a
defendant not qualified by usual concepts to raise the issue. As Justice
Shimoiizaka indicated in his dissent, neither the issue nor the party
were actually within the reach of the Court. Like its United States
counterpart, 92 the Japanese Supreme Court must continue to seek a
proper scope for its powers, and proper modes for their exercise, in
order to meet the needs of a changing society.
"See, e.g., (1) Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Sedler, Standing to
Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in tihe Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962);
(2) Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) ; Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), for recent United States Supreme Court questings.
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